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Despite the comparative impulse to posit Thomas Moynihan within the lineage 
of Reza Negarestani’s “theory fiction,” all such compulsions ought to be curbed. 
Moynihan, a young philosopher hailing from the UK, is a fine example of what 
has recently been termed “post-continental philosophy”, i.e. philosophy that 
makes no distinction between analytic and continental divisions. Moynihan, a 
thinker who collectively parses through the philosophy of science and history 
with adroit ease, situates his discourse on cosmology and spinal trauma within 
the hyper-genealogical tradition of Friedrich Nietzsche, Georges Canguilhem, 
and Michel Foucault. However, to reduce Moynihan to the terms of archeological 
historiography would be folly—indeed, Spinal Catastrophism (2019) unfolds as an 
intellectual “cabinet of curiosities,” its thoroughly researched medical acumen 
matched by the haunted echoes bridling the book’s ghostly pages (which feature 
detached crooning skulls and inflected serpentine spines galore). Demonstrating 
how every cognitive prosthesis creates its own neurosis while simultaneously 
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wedding philosophers written out of history with esoteric biogeochemists and 
curious medics, Moynihan’s inaugural book is at once erudite and ominous—a 
challenging, albeit most rewarding, read.  
At the heart of Moynihan’s project are occult synergies that produce a kind of 
deep horrorism, fascinated with alternate catastrophic forecasts. Despite what 
one may assume, however, this book does not simply produce a kind of 
enchantment properly reducible to fanciful philosophical indulgences but, 
instead, is a markedly political endeavor. Make no mistake, behind Moynihan’s 
cheeky fatalism—the book resounds with a final crescendo of omnicide qua 
dynamite-induced implosion—is a philosopher well aware of the Anthropocene 
and the operant existential planetary risks that threaten the Earth’s ecosystem, 
which creep closer with every carbon emission. Rather than participate in the 
perhaps overwrought literary prognostic of prediction and posthumous 
caretaking, however, Moynihan's altogether unique mode of “theory fiction” 
invigorates speculative geoengineering, terraforming, and macro-strategy1 
through the interplay of reason and intellectual magnetism. In addition, the 
prudent reader will notice a thread of subtle Hegelianism interwoven within 
Spinal Catastrophism’s plexus, perhaps best abridged by the apothegm that “animal 
makes itself ”. 
How, exactly, does animal make itself, then? Where media studies would 
rejoinder that “animal makes itself ” through reticulated and intermedial agential 
artifacts, political science might pose cultural cleavages and striated ethnic lines 
manipulated by political entrepreneurs. Rather than committing to an inquiry 
on technology and new media, Moynihan examines the spinal cord as a properly 
archeological media object and, consulting André Leroi-Gourhan’s Speech and 
Gesture (1964), considers how "[t]he freeing of the areas of the motor cortex of the 
brain, definitely accomplished with erect posture [...] will be complete when we 
succeed in exteriorizing the human motor brain".2 Drawing from the German 
tradition of philosophical anthropology (a genealogy that runs from Ernst Kapp 
to Arnold Gehlen), Leroi-Gourhan examined the human, woefully and radically 
underdetermined, as the animal that necessarily externalizes itself through the 
implementation of “artificial organs”. (p.19) Moynihan reverses Leroi-Gourhan's 
 
1 Thomas Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism: A Secret History (MIT Press, 2019), p. 34. 
2 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech (MIT Press, 1993), p. 248. 
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dictum that the “standards of natural organs should be applied to such artificial 
organs” (p. 111) by imbuing the spine with a kind of accented sociotechnical and 
electronic intelligence.  
Thus, both following and modernizing Leroi-Gourhan’s seminal study of 
mechanical reproducibility and externalization, Moynihan’s book complicates a 
particular contemporary trend within posthumanism festering in popular science 
and cultural studies.3 If we parse the posthuman trajectory along Moynihan’s 
intellectual framework, diachronization is revealed to be relative to technization 
and organology, rather than bondaged to any specific or discrete technology or 
politically socialized technological dispositif. If the spinal cord is a media object, 
then its erect positioning indexes its actuarial operative use. Playfully engaging in 
German philosopher of technology Ernst Kapp’s dictum that humanity 
externalizes itself, Moynihan carves a world whereby the biological human is 
erased while materially producing consciousness in itself (that is, externalization 
as an inflected process). Coupling Leroi-Gourhan’s description of programmed 
standardization with Kapp's writing on "organ projection",4 Moynihan examines 
"planetary autonoesis", (p. 177) whereby a kind of accidental bio-mimicry is 
realized in the ways that we externalize ourselves through autonomic feedback 
loops, bypassing the brain. (The guileful reader will notice myriad parallels 
between second order cybernetics and Moynihan’s description of 
environmentally and allometrically scaled evolution.) 
Following Moynihan’s recounted archive of occult medical annals, 
bipedalism, the nexus of hominization, is the root of all trauma. Accordingly, 
Moynihan queries:  
“[c]ould all observable structure, then, be some astronomically distributed and 
rarefied ‘neurosystem’, some Dysonian Organprojektion? physics itself the externalized 
‘nervous array’ of computational behemoths and their ongoing interaction?” (p. 67) 
 
3 Simply consider the wide media coverage of Elon Musk’s NeuraLink and the transhumanist 
technofetishization colouring Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek's branch of accelerationism, which advocates 
for full automation whereby “the tendencies towards automation and the replacement of human labor 
should be enthusiastically accelerated”. See: Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, "#Accelerate Manifesto for 
an Accelerationist Politics", in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds), #Accelerate: The Accelerationist 
Reader (Urbanomic, 2014), p. 109. 
4 For further reading, see: Ernst Kapp, Elements of a Philosophy of Technology: On the Evolutionary History of 
Culture (University of Minnesota Press, 2018). 
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This is the collective closure between astronomer Fred Hoyle's theory of 
“morphological evolution”5 as an emancipation from anthropocentricism and 
philosopher of science Milan M. Ćirković's “indistinguishability thesis”. As such, 
Moynihan writes that “intellect tends towards environmental manipulation”, 
wherefore any “sufficiently advanced intelligence becomes entirely 
indistinguishable from its own environment”. (p. 67) Within this belated 
cosmogony of the spinal cord-cum-megalith, environment and thought are 
enraptured in a kind of mutualist dance. Scoliosis-impacted floating spines and 
encephalized skulls litter Spinal Catastrophism’s cosmic mythos, at ends with the 
spinal-radial axis that grounds the reader along the Earth’s mold. An index for 
the unencumbered human, the floating spine serves as an answer to fatalist 
doom. 
Another bridge soon appears (such ephemeral bricolage dazzles Spinal 
Catastorphism) via the Fermi Paradox, the term given to the enigma troubling 
theoretical arguments that indicate that there ought to be countless other 
intelligent species in the universe, despite all observational and empirical 
evidence that suggests otherwise. In contrast to the Baudrillardian hyperreal, 
Moynihan’s writing is much closer to Cirkovoc’s “simulation hypothesis”, which 
describes "a simulation created by Programmers of an underlying, true reality 
and run on the advanced computers of that underlying reality".6 Moynihan’s 
“simulation”, while unaffixed to traditional computational devices (and, 
consequentially, freed from rationalist responsibility), is run through a 
permutation of Schopenhauer’s notion of reality as a nervous simulation—if the 
Central Nervous System is a parasite, then “reality is itself the symptomology of 
viral invasion”. (p. 254)   
Fermi’s paradox brings us to the Polish science fiction author and philosopher 
Stanisław Lem,7 whose mythic fabricated scientist, Aristides Acheropoulos, offers 
a “New Cosmogony” that breaks with metaphysical systems and natural science, 
offering a purely preflexive idea of the material world. Acheropoulos booms, 
“Tertium non datur, the world was created by No One, though it was created 
 
5 For further reading, see: Fred Hoyle, The Origin of the Universe and the Origin of Religion (Moyer Bell, 1993). 
6 Milan M. Ćirković, The Great Silence: Science and Philosophy of Fermi's Paradox (Oxford University Press, 
2018), 122. 
7 It was Lem who originally coined the phrase “Fermi’s Paradox”. For further reading, see: Stanisław 
Lem, Solaris, tr. Joanna Kilmartin (Mariner, 2002). 
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nonetheless”. Consequently, Acheropoulos cosmologizes ludics and Moynihan, 
following suite, surreptitiously marries instincts with drives. 
Acheropoulos’ enraptured battle with Professor D.C. Barker8 is deeply knitted 
within the fabric of Spinal Catastrophism, mirroring Moynihan’s epic clamor 
between the Central Nervous System and the Autonomic Nervous System. This 
nested antagonism, once again, reflects Moynihan’s implied Hegelianism, where 
an ontological paradox of dialectical historicity is premised on an open Whole 
that is irremediably ruptured by its own absolute negativity.  Professor Barker, the 
renegade cryptographer, is silently plucked from Nick Land/CCRU’s universe 
(although Moynihan, devilish “theory fiction” trickster that he is, uses “in world” 
citations, requiring that the reader be privy to their own research)—one may 
recall this is a scientist who “has spent his life decoding ancient scripts, quasibiotic 
residues, and anomalous mineral patterns”.9  
For Barker, it is trauma that externalizes itself, rather than self-consciousness 
or technics. As Barker once quipped, “trauma is a body”.10 Professor Barker, 
following the lineage of JG Ballard (himself a non-conformist Kantian), maps 
“spinal catastrophism”11 along trans-organic lines, drawing topological and 
geometrical similarities between the human cranial vault and the Boötes void, 
alongside “the mammal’s swollen calvarium and the concavity of the Chicxulub 
crater”. (pp. 72) Such terrestrial parallels inform the system Moynihan slyly 
carves, decorated idiosyncratic and forgotten “parascience” curiosities coupled 
alongside genuine scientific axioms. For instance, describing a latent desire for 
cosmological symmetry, Moynihan lists secret morphisms and tectologies—a 
personal favorite is paleontologists' once-popularized idea of dinosaurs owning a 
posterior "second brain". (p. 76) 
An excavator of hermetic mystique, Moynihan recovers German philosopher 
of the unconscious, Eduard von Hartmann (whom Nietzsche unabashedly 
censured, effectively writing out of history), so as to divulge a disquisitive 
 
8 Professor Barker, himself, a descendent of Deleuze and Guattari’s Professor Challenger, an inhabitant 
of A Thousand Plateaus (though appropriated, in turn, from Conan Doyle’s oevre). 
9 Nick Land, Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007 (Urbanomic, 2011), p. 506 
10 Ibid., 498. 
11 The term “spinal catastrophism” was originally coined in one of Professor Barker's publications, as 
noted in in Fanged Noumena (p. 505). In Moynihan’s book, this fictitious paper is surreptitiously cited as 
follows: 'Spinal Catastrophism', Plutonics, vol. X, No. 10, Spring 1992. 
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physiophilosophy. By culling Hartmann, Moynihan professes the possibility of 
"Alien Spine Syndrome", whereby a nested assemblage of praxial junctures in 
the spine autonomously correlates to instinctual behavior sans brain-arbitage or 
any cerebral passthrough. Uncovering how the Central Nervous System could 
operatively profess a kind of "spinal soul", Moynihan marries Hartmann's 
philosophy of the unconscious with physiologist Marshall Hall's "reflex theory", 
providing a cartography of integrative sensory-motor responses that require no 
functional participation from the brain. Thus, one stumbles upon somnabulent 
subjects “thinking within their trunks” (p. 198), who haunt and lumber across the 
pages of Spinal Catastrophism. It is no wonder that these littered gyrating spinal 
chords are so eager to lift themselves off the page. 
Moynihan's disarticulated horology is central to his notion of "Spinal 
Catastrophism", for these parasiting spinal artifacts are the bearers of time and 
lost temporality, calcified heterochronic signifiers. Moynihan echoes 17th-century 
Danish geologist Nicolaus Steno's laws of stratigraphy, which describe the 
patterns in which rock layers are deposited through a tripartite mold: 1) original 
horizontality, 2) cross-cutting relationships, and 3) lateral continuity. Moynihan 
extends Steno’s Law onto vertebral levels. Consequently, not only are bodies 
mystified, reduced to “glaciated temporality,” (p. 89) but, accordingly, spinal 
chords are valorized as regionalized memory, indices of (a collective) neural saga. 
Such is Spinal Catastrophism’s trajectory: we begin with Kant’s musing on the 
earth, veer towards externalizing and inflected bodies, vivisect a few cadavers, 
and harvest their spines. Not only do these phantom spines suggest collapse but 
their stratigraphic layering reminisces of the earth and its plutonic depths. 
Consequently, it is only appropriate that Moynihan eventually guides us, once 
again, back to the Earth (although not before circuiting us through a 
psychoanalytic lagoon, bubbling with Sándor Ferenczi’s writing on archaeo-
evolutionary geological inscription). 
"How gentle and soothing, if death were really nothing but ceasing to be, but 
is there such a thing as 'mere death'?"12 Recall that the “post-Kantian School’s” 
point of contact with theology qua eschatology almost always produced 
cosmogenic traces. In this tradition, neurosis, musing over death, unfailingly 
 
12 Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (Routledge, 1991), p. 128. 
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leaves a script, a last vestige of fractured idealism. In Schopenhauer's thought, for 
instance, we see that a philosophy of redemption relies upon our pure extinction, 
although there is a caveat: how can we be certain that this process won’t simply 
repeat itself? Thus, following Schopenhaur, von Hartmann13 claimed that the 
cyclic world process is doomed to sputter out yet another humanoid species and 
therefore, we must break the cycle by creating an absolute universal negation of 
the world (thus begins his arcane metaphysics). It is, therefore, our duty to die. 
Moynihan writes that, in order to ensure a universal annihilation, "[w]e must 
remove the potential for any other future nervous systems—anywhere”. (p.267) 
This is where Moynihan’s final chapter places us, virtuously planted within 
superlative extinction, a Stygian universal negation where we must all become 
what Jean Paul Richter contemporaneously called the coming “Dead Christ”.14 
This is the most sublime of all omnicide: supernovae's heliotrope plasma-clouds 
besmirch the sky and fractured spines finally falter in unison, pattering like hail 
while betraying their once-remarkable erect verticality. Following Moynihan’s 
hyperstitious hysteria, the spine becomes an aesthetic media object; much like 
art, the spine traps the jouissance of fragmentary “time in a pure state”,15 the 
chronogenetic artifact par excellence. Riffing on HG Wells’ pitch-black 
pessimism, Moynihan concludes that “[m]ind may well be at the end of its bony 
tether”. (p. 267) Ergo, it is the duty of the autonomous spine, the clandestine 
recorder, keeper of all grammatization and humanity’s tragic chronicler, to 
destroy the universe—or, conversely, the spine is the universe's articulation of the 
ethical duty to self-destruct. (p. 268) 
While Spinal Catastrophism’s disquietude is steeped in the protracted heritage 
of “theory fiction”, Moynihan's appropriation of Leroi-Gourhan’s externalization 
also recalls Bernard Stiegler's recent work on technics and the exosomatized 
body, through which the transdividuated subject “becomes intrinsically fetishistic 
and whose instincts become drives”.16 Furthermore, both Moynihan and Stiegler 
complicate zoological accounts of noetic cerebral organs that are veritably 
 
13 Notably, von Hartmann considered the spine to be “the seat of the unconscious”; see Thomas 
Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism, p. 88. 
14 J.P. Richter, “Speech of the Dead Christ from the Universe that There is No God’, in Jean Paul: A 
Reader, tr. E. Casey (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 179-83. 
15 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, tr. C.K. Scott Moncrieff (Marcel Proust, 2012), p. 2621. 
16 Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption (Polity Press, 2019), p. 274. 
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immersed in a libidinal economy of différance vis-à-vis the brain and the brain, 
alone.17 Where we, once upon a time, had Galls' phrenology, in which "spirit is a 
bone", today we see the unabashed dominance of a new kind of “soft 
phrenology”, whereby spirit is blithely cofounded with thought and reduced to 
gelatinous cognition as a synonym for causality. In response to this proof of 
plasticity as the epigenesis of reason, both Stiegler and Moynihan propose an 
organological condition, albeit most distinctly. While Stiegler focuses on digital 
protentions as pharmakon, parsing automation and algorithmic govenmentality 
for how they incur proletarianization, Moynihan’s hypergenealogy recounts an 
imperative of naught, where the subtraction of responsibility becomes self-
reflecting. Nonetheless, Spinal Catastrophism basks in a kind of restrained sanguine 
buoyancy, which the Postscript so acutely reveals, recounting a narrative of 
nature's history outstripping the human so as, quite possibly, to frame “entropy’s 
dark laughter”18 as our epochal moment, whereby the full scale of planetary risk 
and ruination is near impossible to fully imagine.  
 
ee2447@columbia.edu 
 
17 This is, in fact, why Stiegler admonishes Catherine Malabou’s work on (neuro)plasticity as erroneous, 
remarking that “this noetic organ is constituted through identification, idealization, sublimation and the 
super-ego, which are not, properly speaking, cerebral even though they pass through the brain. This is what 
Catherine Malabou fails to understand…” See: Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 257. Similarly, 
Moynihan instrumentalizes psychoanalysis to bridge neuronic antagonism with topographical scales, the 
stratigraphic earth and its plutonic depths refracting the weighty brain’s incumbrance, which the spinal 
cord is forced to buttress (once again, it is no wonder that these spinal cords seek to wrest themselves free). 
Both Stiegler and Moynihan engage with autonomic processing and its environmental feedback so as to 
move beyond accounts of artifactual externalization/media as “organ projection”, recognizing how these 
artifacts are readily engaged in reorganizing Umwelt (tying operative media as that which is both 
libidinal/drive-based and insensate/espoused to instinctual relay).  
18 Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism, p. 276. 
